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are significantly more likely to cease working as a result
of becoming eligible for public insurance, and are also
more likely to move to part-time work.

1. Introduction
This dissertation is a collection of essays analyzing the
interplay between aging and the labor market. The first
chapter demonstrates that differential treatment by age
exists in labor markets and explores different possible
explanations. As the baby boom cohort reaches retirement
age, demographic pressures on public programs such
as Social Security may cause policymakers to cut
benefits and encourage work at later ages. This chapter
reports on a labor market experiment to determine the
hiring conditions for older women in entry-level jobs in
Boston, Massachusetts, and st. Petersburg, Florida. I find
differential interviewing by age for these jobs. A younger
worker is more than 40 percent more likely to be offered
an interview than an older worker. I find no evidence
to support taste-based discrimination as a reason for
this differential and some evidence to support statistical
discrimination.
The second chapter examines more closely one of
the possible reasons for this differential treatment. Older
workers may cost employers more in terms of potential
age discrimination lawsuits. I study the effects of state
and federal age discrimination laws between 1968 and
1991. Prior to the enforcement of the federal law, state
laws had little effect on older workers, suggesting that
firms either knew little about these laws or did not see
them as a threat. After the enforcement of the federal Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) in 1979,
white male workers over the age of 50 in states with age
discrimination laws work fewer weeks per year and are
less likely to be hired or separated from their jobs, but are
more likely to be retired (perhaps involuntarily). These
findings suggest a story in which firms do not wish to hire
older workers, are afraid to fire older workers, and remove
older workers through strong incentives to retire in states
where lawsuits are less of a hurdle for the worker.
The third chapter, coauthored with Melissa Boyle,
explores the relationship between health insurance
coverage and labor market efficiencies termed 'job-lock."
We exploit an insurance option that is both exogenous to
work decisions and of lasting duration. A major expansion
in both the services provided and the popUlation covered
by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) health care
system allows us to both cleanly estimate the extent
of job-lock, and also to study the impact of publicly
provided health care on labor supply. Using data from
the Current Population Survey, we examine the impact
of health care coverage on labor force participation and
retirement by comparing veterans and nonveterans before
and after the VA expansion. Results indicate that workers
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In its current state, the Social Security trust fund will
reach zero in 2041. One commonly suggested solution
to the Social Security problem is to encourage older
workers to continue working past retirement (Diamond
and Orszag 2002). Not only would these workers still be
paying Social Security taxes, but the normal retirement
age could then be raised (thus cutting benefits) without
compromising the living standards ofthese older workers.
Will Americans be able to find work at older ages? This
dissertation explores the determinants of work at older
ages, including age discrimination and health insurance.
Many older Americans need to work. Bernheim
(1997) suggests that baby boomers on average are only
saving a third of what would be needed to maintain a preretirement standard of living after retirement. This lack of
adequate retirement savings is especially acute for older
women who have been unexpectedly separated from their
spouses. On average, widows suffer a 30 percent drop in
living standards upon the death of a husband (Holden and
Zick 1998) and the poverty rate for older widows is 15
percent (Favreault and Sammartino 2002).
Older Americans are now capable of working at later
ages than in years past. Studies suggest that today's 70year-olds are comparable in health and mental function
to 65-year-olds from 30 years ago (Schaie 1996). In
addition to the monetary benefits to working, there are
also health and psychological benefits to work. Working
in later ages may contribute to an older person's mental
acuity and provide a sense of usefulness. Indeed, when
surveyed, many people say they wish to continue working
at least part time into later ages as a bridge to retirement
(Abraham and Houseman 2004).
Americans will need to work longer, they are capable
of working longer, and many say they wish to work
longer. Will they be able to find work at later ages? If
employers are not willing to hire older workers, then
cutting Social Security or Medicare benefits may impose a
greater burden on older Americans than planned.

1.2 Age Discrimination in the Labor Market
If an employer makes a decision to hire a younger
worker over an older worker based on age, that employer
is practicing age discrimination. Using the most basic
definition, discrimination is defined as treating people in
one group differently than people in another group, based
solely on group characteristics rather than individual
differences. Thus, preferring workers with college degrees

is a form of discrimination against high school workers.
Generally people do not worry when college graduates
are hired over high school graduates; college-educated
workers may be higher quality, and, given effort and
ability, a high school graduate could change his or her
status. The type of discrimination economists tend to
worry about most is the kind one thinks of when one
ordinarily uses the term discrimination-what economists
term animus or "taste-based" discrimination. Tastebased discrimination occurs when one group dislikes
another group for no sufficient reason. This type of
discrimination does not benefit anyone economically.
However, another type of discrimination is almost as
troubling: "statistical" discrimination. When it is costly
for an employer to determine specific characteristics of an
individual applicant or worker, sometimes the employer
will make assumptions about the applicant based on
group characteristics. Thus, as in the earlier example, a
college graduate may be assumed to be a more highly
skilled worker than a high school graduate, regardless of
actual skill. When statistical discrimination is based on a
group-status that a high-ability worker can change, such
as education level, economists generally do not worry
about it. However, when the group in question is based on
race, gender, or age, then many high-ability workers may
be unjustly discriminated against because it is costly for
employers to test true ability.

2.1 Existence of Age Discrimination
There has been very little evidence to show whether
age discrimination exists in hiring. Abraham and
Houseman (2004) find that although most older workers
plan to continue working at least part time instead of fully
retiring, those who would have to change jobs in order
to reduce hours are likely to stop working entirely. This
finding suggests that either workers who would have to
switch jobs to cut hours are more likely to change their
minds about working part time or there is something
preventing them from finding a new job. However, what
is preventing them mayor may not be discrimination.
Researchers using the Displaced Workers Survey
from the Current Population Survey find that older
workers who have lost their jobs because of layoffs or
plant closings take longer to find a new job than younger
workers who have similarly lost their jobs (Diamond and
Hausman 1984). These findings could be evidence of
discrimination against older job seekers. However, even
though older workers have more trouble finding jobs
than younger workers, that does not mean that firms are
systematically choosing not to hire an older worker over
a younger worker. Older workers may be used to getting
higher wages based on their expertise in a former firm;
because they know the ins and outs of that specific firm,

2

they are more productive there than they would be in a
new firm. Economists term this concept "firm-specific
human capital." Workers with longer job tenure have
more firm-specific human capital, and thus higher wages
in the old job. New firms cannot use this firm-specific
human capital; thus, workers may be less valuable to
the new firm than to the old firm, and an older worker
expecting to be paid the same wage will be unable to find
work at that price. Older workers may also be clustered
in industries and occupations where demand for workers
is lower, or have less education on average than younger
workers. Either of these situations would lead to older
workers having more difficulty finding jobs than younger,
even in the absence of discrimination.
Psychologists have tested for age discrimination
more directly. In studies where undergraduates or human
resource managers are given resumes that are identical
except for age and asked to hypothetically choose
between them, they will usually choose the younger of
the two candidates (Nelson 2002). While these studies
are highly suggestive that age discrimination does exist in
labor markets, they are not conclusive because they do not
measure what is actually going on in the hiring process.
For example, because it is illegal to discriminate based
on age, even if hiring managers hypothetically prefer
younger workers, they may hire the older worker at least
some of the time in practice because they fear potential
lawsuits.
In Chapter I of the dissertation, I test age
discrimination by presenting interview choices to actual
employers in the labor market and measuring their
genuine responses. I sent out resumes for job applicants
with different ages and measured the response rate of
employers asking for interviews. This type of study is
called an "audit study" and has been useful in the past for
determining race and gender discrimination in labor and
housing markets. In these studies, researchers sent out
two trained "auditors," matched in all respects except the
variable of interest, usually race, to rent an apartment, buy
a house or interview for ajob (e.g., Fix and Struyk 1992;
Neumark, Bank, and VanNort 1996; Yinger 1998).
There are some limits to the audit technology. Because
it is difficult to find an older person who is identical to a
younger person except for age, I could not actually send
people to interview for jobs. Thus I only have information
about the first part of the hiring screening process-from
resume to interview. However, studies on gender and
race find additional discrimination once the candidates
have reached the interview stage, so it is likely that older
applicants being interviewed will not be preferred over
younger applicants.
I sent 3,996 resumes to firms in the Boston,
Massachusetts, and SI. Petersburg, Florida, metropolitan
areas. These resumes were for job applicants between the

2006 Dissertation Summaries

ages of35 and 62. Because most people do not actually
put their ages on resumes but do put the date of their
education degrees, I indicate age by date of high school
graduation. Job listings were found via the local Sunday
want-ads and through cold-calling firms listed in local
phone books.
Because I was worried that employers might infer
things I could not measure about the resumes differently
for older workers than for younger workers, I had to limit
the types of resumes I looked at. It is difficult to know
what employers value in a work history for different
jobs; therefore I only applied to entry-level jobs, or jobs
that required up to a year of education and experience
combined. These included positions such as clerical work,
licensed practical nurse, air conditioner repair person, or
nail technician, among others. Applicauts also have short
work histories in very entry-level fields such as data entry
or fast food.
I also limit my sample to female job applicants. When
an adult mau applies for an entry-level job, especially
with only a short work history, the employer is likely to
think that there is something wrong with that mau. In the
worst case scenario, the employer might think the man
had been incarcerated, and the older man incarcerated for
longer than the younger with the same resume. However,
employers generally assume that a female applicant has
been at home taking care of her family, regardless of age.
Since the majority of the jobs applied for in this study
are in female-dominated industries, my experiment gives
a very accurate picture of the job opportunities for one
of the most at-risk populations of older workers-recent
widows and divorcees needing to find work. This
popUlation is highly likely to be affected by policy
changes.
Figure I shows the downward trend of the probability
of being called in for an interview by age in the two cities.
I find that a younger worker is more than 40 percent
more likely to be called back for au interview than an
older worker, where older is defined as age 50 or older. In
Massachusetts, this trend translates into a younger seeker
having to send in 19 resumes for one interview request
and an older seeker having to send in 27. Similarly, in
Florida these numbers are 16.4 aud 23, respectively.
Of course, these numbers are only averages and
include people applying for different types of jobs,
as well as resumes that have different educational
requirements, such as nursing certificates for those
applying for Licensed Practical Nurse (LPN) positions
or a cosmetology license for hair stylist applicants. Thus,
different parts ofthe population may end up having to
send a different number of applications before finding
employment. For example, a younger worker qualified as
a licensed practical nurse (LPN) in Florida would have
to respond to 5.5 ads before receiving an interview offer,
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whereas au older worker would have to respond to 10.
However, a younger worker looking for clerical work in
Massachusetts would have to send 32 job applications and
au older worker would have to send 72.
Why can't an older worker send in more resumes than
a younger to get the same number of interview requests?
In order for an older worker to be able to do that, there
would have to be an infinite (or at least very large)
number of job openings available each week. However,
for most fields, there are not. Although a paper for a
metropolitau area such as St. Petersburg-Tampa Bay may
have two or three dozen ads looking for LPNs or dental
assistants, there are many fewer jobs advertised for other
positions. There are generally fewer than lOads each
week for preschool teacher or hair dresser. Some positions
are rarely advertised at all, such as gem appraiser (an
occupation that requires 6 months to a year of training).
Additionally, mauy of the ads run for more than one week
at a time, thus making many ads in a week repeats from
the previous week.
Using a back of the envelope calculation, I estimate
how long it takes au older worker to find a job compared
to a younger worker, assuming she applies to all
applicable ads in the paper every week. Ifwe assume
that it takes 7-10 interviews to obtain a position (which
may be optimistic, since that is the estimate for college
graduates), then a younger LPN will receive ajob offer in
a week, and an older LPN will have to wait 3 weeks for
a job offer. At the other extreme, a younger worker will
take 6-10 weeks to receive a clerical job offer (assuming
that half of the ads each week are repeats each week),
and an older worker will not receive a job offer for 14-20
weeks. This figure could be even larger, since within a
five-month period there are even more repeat ads; places
that advertised and rejected the older worker in month one
will advertise again in month five.
Figure 1 Probability of an Interview by Age
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Thus there are real welfare effects of this age

discrimination for older workers, especially for those
who most need work: those with low savings. Cutting
federal benefits could have real effects for these workers
because they may have more trouble finding work
than younger workers. It is important to know why

younger workers are preferred to older in order to make
appropriate policy recommendations concerning the
needs and desires of older job seekers. For example, if
the problem is an irrational dislike of older people (tastebased discrimination), educating employers or more
strictly enforcing discrimination laws in hiring may be
appropriate. However, if older workers in general lack a
certain skills set, then additional training programs for
these workers targeted at those skills may be of help. If

older workers are more costly because they cost more
for the company in terms of health insurance, then
the government may want to subsidize these costs or
encourage methods of health insurance that shift cost from
the firm to the worker, such as private health accounts.

2.2 Reasons for Age Discrimination
I am also able to test some of these possible reasons
in Chapter 1. Table I shows a list oftop 10 reasons from
a survey of employers that asked employers why other
employers might be reluctant to hire older workers. Some
ofthese reasons do not apply to the entry-level set-up for

which I found discrimination. For example, since these
are entry-level jobs, the length of the career path is short,
thus career potential (the most listed reason) shouldn't
matter. Salary expectations (reason 5) may also be less of
an issue, since these jobs often have set salary schedules.
Additionally, the resumes list current work experience,
so there should not be worries about the reason why the
applicant left the previous job (reason 9) as the applicant
is currently employed. Because there is discrimination
even in the absence of these possible reasons, there must
be other explanations for the differential treatment.
Some of the reasons listed could be explored using the
experimental framework described above. For example,
if employers think that older workers are more likely to
lack computer skills than are younger workers (a version
of reason 7, knowledge and skills obsolescence), then
if an older worker can indicate that she has these skills
employers will be less likely to discriminate against her.
Thus, information about computer skills should help the
older seeker more than the younger if it is indicated for
both, because the employer already assumed that the
younger seeker had these skills. Similarly, an attendance
award on a previous job should alleviate worries that an
older worker will have more absences than a similarly
qualified younger worker (reason 6). Using this technique,
I find that employers may fear a lack of computer skills,
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Table 1 Reasons for Differential Hiring
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Short career potential (specific HC investment)
Lack energy
Costs of health and life insurance and pensions
Less flexible/adaptable
Higher salary expectations
Health risks ~> absences
Knowledge and skills obsolescence
Block career paths of younger workers
Suspicion about competence (why leave job?)
Fear of discrimination suit

SOURCE: List taken from Rhine (1984).
but only in the Massachusetts sample. I find no evidence
that employers are worried about absences.
I tried to test for a few of the other reasons on the
list as well, with less success. To see if reason 2, lack
of energy, is a reason employers prefer not to hire older
workers, I put on some resumes that the applicant plays a
sport. I find that this item harms both older and younger
workers, so it is probably not signaling energy, but rather
the likelihood of getting an injury while playing sports
over the weekend. Similarly, putting down "I am flexible"
or "I am willing to embrace change," as the AARP
suggests to signal flexibility and adaptability (reason
4), actually hurts older workers. Instead of showing
flexibility and adaptability, such statements may just be
showing that the applicant is a member of the AARP. The
remaining reasons for differential treatment could not be
tested under this scenario.
A possible reason for differential treatment of older
workers, one not mentioned in the Rhine survey, is tastebased discrimination, an irrational dislike of older people
in the workplace. Employers may dislike older workers
("employer taste-based discrimination"), employees may
not like working with older workers ("employee tastebased discrimination"), or people could dislike buying
products that older workers are selling ("consumer
taste-based discrimination"). I test these possibilities in
my experimental framework by making an assumption
that younger people dislike being around older people
more than older people do. Using this assumption, I can
match the age distribution of an area with the interview
rates in my sample by zip code. I find that neither the age
distribution of employees nor of customers in a zip code
has any effect on the interview rates in an area. Thus I
find no evidence for this kind of irrational discrimination.
However, there are two problems with this method. First,
I only have age distribution information by zip code
rather than by firm; thus I cannot exactly match up the age
composition of the firms doing the hiring, so my results
are biased toward finding no result, because I might not
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be measuring what I am hoping to measure. Secondly. the
assumption about age preferences may not be true: older
and younger people may have no difference in preferences
for whom they associate with. or older people may prefer
being with younger people to a much greater extent than
younger people do.
To test employer taste-based discrimination. I compare
firms with human resources departments to those
without human resources departments. Human resource
professionals may have less taste-based discrimination
because of training and knowledge of discrimination
laws. Iffirms with human resources departments are
more likely to interview older workers than firms without
human resources departments, that would support tastebased discrimination, since places with HR departments
know it is illegal to discriminate and that discrimination
has consequences. However, firms with HR departments
may be more likely to practice statistical discrimination
because they have more knowledge of the productivity
and costs of older workers and applicants compared
to younger. I find that firms with human resources
departments may be more likely to interview younger
workers, which would support the case of statistical rather
than taste-based discrimination, but this finding is not
significant. Thus, now that age discrimination in hiring
has been shown to exist, there is still room for research as
to the determinants of age discrimination.

3. The Effects of Age Discrimination Laws
Age discrimination laws are another reason that older
workers may be more costly to employ than younger.
Chapter 2 ofthe dissertation explores the effect of
age discrimination laws on labor market outcomes for
older workers. Employers may be afraid to hire older
workers because older workers can sue them under the
age discrimination act if they are later fired or fail to be
promoted. It is much easier for an employer to avoid
these kinds of lawsuits by simply failing to hire an older
worker, since the older worker generally cannot prove that
he or she has been discriminated against during the hiring
stage, but the worker has more evidence about why he or
she was fired or not promoted (Gustman and Steinmeier
1994). I compare labor market outcomes of older people
in states where it is easier to sue under age discrimination
laws to older people in states where it is not as easy to sue.
Age discrimination laws prohibit differential treatment
in the labor market based on age. The first state age
discrimination law was instituted in 1903 in Colorado,
and by 1960, eight states had age discrimination laws.
Federal legislation protecting older workers overall did
not appear until 1967, with the introduction of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, (ADEA). The 1967
ADEA prohibited age based discrimination for those
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aged 40--65 in firms with 20 or more workers. Under
this act, employers were barred from using age in hiring,
laying off, firing, compensation, or other conditions of
employment. It also prohibited employers from using
age-specific language in advertising. In 1978, congress
extended the protected age group to 40-70 and eliminated
mandatory retirement for most federal employees. A
second major change, in terms of enforcement, came in
1979 when the Department of Labor (and, for federal
employment, the U.S. Civil Service Commission)
gave administrative responsibility to the U.S. Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Most
researchers agree that this change strengthened the power
of the ADEA since the change came with an increase
in resources and an increase in "pattern and practice"
lawsuits (Neumark 2001).
State age discrimination laws are important because
with a large backlog of cases, the EEOC rarely prosecutes
claims itself. If a state has statutes, the claimant must file
with the state Fair Employment Practices (FEP) office
within 300 days, otherwise the claimant must first file
with the EEOC within 180 days. After the enforcement
of the ADEA, white older men in states where it is easier
to sue are less likely to be hired than such men in states
where it is more difficult. They are also less likely to be
fired and more likely to say they are retired. Overall, older
white men work fewer weeks per year in states where it is
easier to sue than in states where it is not as easy to sue.
These findings suggest that firms do not wish to hire older
men, are afraid to fire older men, and remove older men
through strong incentives to retire in states where lawsuits
are less of a hurdle for the men.
However, fear of lawsuits under age discrimination
laws cannot tell the entire story. There is no effect of ease
of lawsuit on the hiring possibilities for women. This
fact could be because older women are the least litigious
group in the United States-in general, older women just
do not sue. Thus employers do not see potential lawsuits
as a possible cost to hiring an older woman, just to hiring
an older man. Future research needs to be done to explore
other possible reasons for age discrimination, such as
health care costs.

4. Health Insnrance, Job-Lock, and
Veterans Affairs
Chapter 3 of the dissertation explores one possible
link between health insurance and employment of older
workers, but not in the context of age discrimination. This
chapter, coauthored with Melissa Boyle, explores the
relationship between health insurance coverage and labor
market efficiencies termed "job-lock." Job-lock occurs
when health insurance provision is tied to labor market
status. If workers alter their labor supply and retirement
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decisions because of fears over losing health insurance
coverage, this mobility impediment is termed 'job-lock."
The current literature on job-lock has established a
link between health insurance and labor market decisions.
However, this literature has not fully considered whether
the introduction of government-sponsored health care,
such as Medicare or Medicaid, may alleviate job-lock.
Ifworkers have an alternative source of health care
rather than depending solely on employer-provided
insurance, their job mobility may increase. This study can
measure possible labor market effects of expanding these
programs.
We exploit an insurance option that is exogenous to
work decisions, and of lasting duration~the expansion of
the Veterans Affairs health Care system. The Department
of Veterans Affairs (VA) health care system is a network
of hospitals, established over 70 years ago for the purpose
of providing specialty care to low-income veterans and
veterans with conditions resulting from their military
service. In the mid 1990s, the VA expanded in two
different ways. First, VA health care began a shift from an
emphasis on hospital-based specialty services to a focus
on primary care and preventive medicine, dramatically
increasing the number of outpatient visits. Second, the
VA expanded the population they administered to from
low-income and disabled veterans to allow all veterans to
become eligible for care.
This expansion in both the services provided and the
population covered by the Department of Veterans Affairs
health care system allows us to both cleanly estimate the
extent of job-lock, and also to study the impact of publicly
provided health care on labor supply. We use data from
the Current Population Survey to examine the impact
of health care coverage on labor force participation and
retirement using a differences-in-differences estimator by
comparing veterans and nonveterans before and after the
VA expansion.
We find that workers are significantly likely to cease
working as a result of becoming eligible for public
insurance. As a result of gaining VA coverage, the
probability of working drops by 0.34 percentage points
for a prime-aged worker with average characteristics and
by 2.43 percentage points for the average older worker.
The introduction of the VA health care benefit increases
the probability of entering retirement for older workers
by 0.38 percentage points. For prime-aged workers, the
probability that the average veteran is self-employed
increases by 0.14 percentage points, but the average
veteran between the ages of 55 and 64 is less likely to
become self-employed.
In addition to studying the impact of public insurance
availability on the probability of self-employment, we
also examine the effects of insurance on part-time work.
Because most part-time jobs do not provide workers with
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benefits such as health insurance, workers who place a
high value on these benefits may avoid moving into parttime work in order to maintain their health insurance
coverage. In surveys, older workers often state that they
would prefer to transition into retirement by moving
first to part-time employment (Abraham and Houseman
2004). If moving to part-time work means losing health
insurance, however, older workers may be reluctant to
do so. We find that the average veteran is more likely to
work part time than remain full time as a result of gaining
outside health insurance coverage. For older workers, we
estimate a 1.2 percentage point increase in the probability
of working part-time. Prime-aged workers have a 0.4
percentage point increase in the probability of working
part time.
Our results demonstrate a significant effect of public
health insurance on work decisions. We find particularly
strong results for those workers in the 55-M-year-old
age group, who are approaching the normal retirement
age. For this age group, our results suggest a positive
and significant increase in early retirement with the
availability of outside health care coverage. Overall,
our study confrrrns the job-lock effects of tying health
insurance to employment, and suggests that public health
insurance expansions have the potential to alleviate some
of the reductions injob mobility caused by this type of
health insurance regime.

5. Conclnding Comments
This dissertation explores important employment issues
facing older job applicants. First, it clearly demonstrates
the existence of age discrimination and explores some of
the possible reasons for this differential treatment. Second,
it finds that age discrimination laws hurt the labor market
opportunities for white older men. Finally, it shows that
expanding public health care programs for older workers
would increase retirement and part-time work for older
workers, and would increase job mobility and selfemployment for prime-aged workers as well.

References
Abraham, K.G., and S.N. Houseman. 2004. "Work and
Retirement Plans among Older Americans." Upjohn Institute

Staff Working Paper 04-105. Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn
Institute for Employment Research.
Bernheim, B.D. 1997. "The Adequacy of Personal Retirement
Saving: Issues and Options." In Facing the Age Wave, D.
Wise, ed. Palo Alto, CA: Hoover Institute Press.
Diamond, P.A., and 1.A. Hausman. 1984. "The Retirement
and Unemployment Behavior of Older Men." In Retirement
and Economic Behavior, R.J. Aaron, ed. Studies in Social
Economics series. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution,

pp.97-132.

2006 Dissertation Summaries

Diamond, P., and R. Orszag. 2002. "An Assessment of the
Proposals of the President's Commission to Strengthen Social
Security." Contributions to Economic Analysis and Policy
1(1): Article 10.
Favreault, M.M., and F.I. Sammartino. 2002. The Impact of
Social Security Reform on Low-Income and Older Women.
Washington, DC: Public Policy Institute.
Fix, M., and R.I. Struyk. 1992. "An Overview of Auditing
for Discrimination." In Clear and Convincing Evidence:
Measurement ofDiscrimination in America, M. Fix and R.I.
Struyk, eds. Washington, DC: Urban Institute, pp. 1-67.
Gustman,A.L., and T.L. Steinmeier. 1994. "Employer-Provided
Health Insurance and Retirement Behavior." Industrial and
Labor Relations Review 48(1): 124-140.
Holden, K.C., and K.D. Zick. 1998. The Roles a/Social
Insurance, Private Pensions, and Earnings in Explaining the
Economic Vulnerability of Widowed Women in the United
States. United Kingdom: Foundation for International Studies
on Social Security.
Nelson, T.D. 2002. Ageism: Stereotyping and Prejudice against
Older Persons. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Neumark, D. 2001. "Age Discrimination Legislation in the
United States." NBER working paper no. 35. Cambridge, MA:
National Bureau of Economic Research.
Neumark, D., R.J. Bank, and K.D. Van Nort. 1996. "Sex
Discrimination in Restaurant Hiring: An Audit Study."
QuarteriyJournalo/Economics 111(3): 915-941.
Rhine, S.H. 1984. Managing Older Workers: Company Policies
and Attitudes: A Research Report from the Conference Board.
New York: The Conference Board.
Schaie, K.W. 1996. Intellectual Development in Adulthood:
The Seattle Longitudinal Study. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge
University Press.
Yinger, 1. 1998. "Evidence on Discrimination in Consumer
Markets." Journal of Economic Perspectives 12(2): 23-40.

2006 Dissertation Summaries

7

